Securing Singapore/Managing Perceptions: From Shooting the Messenger to Dodging the Question by Woodier, Jonathan
_________________________________________________________________________57
____________________________________ Securing Singapore/Managing Perceptions
Securing Singapore/Managing Perceptions: 




The citizens of Singapore have been in thrall to the governing People's Action 
Party (PAP) and its senior ﬁgure Lee Kuan Yew for almost 45 years. Served by 
a pliant media brought to heel by a combination of legislative and ownership 
controls, the PAP has been effective in limiting the space for debate while suc-
cessfully conveying its own internal messaging aimed at securing the state and 
its own political longevity. It has done this by creating the image of a Singapore 
as a fortress Chinese-led stability and prosperity, ever under threat from more 
restive neighbours. But, in the face of the emerging threats to this control posed 
by new information technology and the exigencies of the global economy, the 
government has been forced to become increasingly sophisticated at manag-
ing perceptions and minimizing controversy. This paper will examine how the 
government has successfully met these challenges in a public relations triumph, 
effectively winning the battle for the hearts and minds of its internal audience, 
as well as shoring up the image of 'Fortress Singapore' and appeasing external 
allies in the 'war against terror', thus keeping Singapore critics in check and 
neutralizing any external political support for domestic political movements.
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Introduction 
Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail. 
Without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently, he who moulds public 
sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. 
He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. (A. 
Lincoln)
 When the then prime minister of Singapore, Goh Chok Tong, received 
an unprecedented welcome during his visit to the US in April 2004, 
it was the outward manifestation of a successful and comprehensive 
campaign by his government to win hearts and minds within his own 
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country and to persuade important external observers that Singapore 
was a fortress of stability in a region of uncertainty. 
A little more than a year before, as the echoes of the bombs in Bali 
and those that destroyed the entrance to the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta 
resounded around Southeast Asia, things could have been very dif-
ferent. The terrorist attacks that came in the wake of 9/11 were a ﬁrm 
reminder that, at a time when the US and its major allies see militant 
Muslims as one of the main threats to global security, Singapore sits on 
the doorstep of the largest Muslim country on earth. An adverse reaction 
from the global business community could have pushed the tiny island 
state, already in the grips of the worst recession in its 36-year history, 
over the brink into an abyss of ﬁnancial ruin.
This small nation is well aware of its precarious position. With a 
devotion born of distress, nurtured through internecine strife and 
neighbourhood konfrontasi (the 1963 Indonesia policy of low-level armed 
raids against Malaysia), and secured in the creation of the most success-
ful economy in Southeast Asia, the citizens of Singapore have been in 
thrall to the governing People's Action Party and its senior ﬁgure Lee 
Kuan Yew for almost 45 years. For its part, the PAP has relished its role 
of protector, barricading what it perceives to be a delicately imagined 
community against forces within and without that it believes seek to 
tear it apart; and the PAP has harnessed the means of communication 
available in the strategically positioned island state to this end (Wil-
liams, 2000, p. 2). Served by a media cognisant of its developmental 
responsibilities, the PAP has been effective in limiting the space for 
debate while successfully conveying its own internal messaging. This 
messaging is aimed at securing both the state and its own political 
longevity by creating the image of a Singapore as a fortress of stable, 
Chinese-led prosperity, beset on all sides by Malay neighbours whose 
economic and political uncertainty leads to violence and crime, often 
directed towards local Chinese minorities.
In the face of the emerging threats to this control posed by new in-
formation technology and the exigencies of the global economy, the 
government has been forced to become increasingly sophisticated at 
managing perceptions and minimizing controversy. This paper will 
examine how the government successfully met this challenge, even 
burnishing its public image in the face of 9/11 and the emergence of 
concerns over militant Islam in Southeast Asia, and rehabilitating itself 
with Western governments, many of which must secretly envy Lee's 
success both economic and political. 
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Long known for an unusual sensitivity over its image, as portrayed 
internally and externally by the mass media, the events of 9/11 and, in 
particular, the bombings in Southeast Asia that followed, the Singapore 
government began a charm offensive: a PR campaign to secure support 
both inside and outside Singapore. The methods used by the Singapore 
government in its efforts to nullify internal democratic pressures and 
limit sites of contestation, as well as to secure inﬂuential allies overseas, 
indicate a mature and sophisticated appreciation of crisis management, 
and an understanding of the growing difﬁculties of conveying its mes-
sages in a complex mass communication environment with multiple 
audiences. The methods are also indicative, as this paper will show, of 
the central role that professional consultants are assuming in continu-
ously interpreting and monitoring public opinion, and in the image 
management of political parties and governments in the region. 
The media, and television in particular, have begun to impact the 
political process even in Southeast Asia, where elites have controlled 
the means of mass communication since independence. Today, like 
many of their counterparts in the West, these elites are ﬁnding that 'the 
management of visibility and self-presentation through the media has 
become an integral and increasingly professionalized feature of gov-
ernment ' (Thompson 2001: 180). A 'battle for the hearts and minds of 
Singaporeans' is now being fought beyond its shores.1 Asia is seen in 
the US, in particular, as a 'risky place … of anti-US protests and Islamic 
extremists with guns' (International Herald Tribune, 19 March 2003: B2). 
Given the importance of the US both to the Singapore economy and 
as a military ally to ensure Singapore's stable future in the region, the 
Singapore government has been forced into a PR charm offensive. In 
this it seeks to portray Singapore as a 'safe' destination for FDI and 
as a hub for security/intelligence exchange; indeed, as a lone fortress 
against the rise of militant Islam in Southeast Asia. Let us examine ﬁrst 
the growing impact of PR on politics, before looking more closely at its 
Singapore manifestation.
The Rise of the Image Makers
Those who manipulate the unseen mechanism of society constitute an 
invisible government which is the true ruling power. We are governed, our 
minds moulded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested largely by men we 
have never heard of ... dominated by the relatively small number of persons 
who understand the mental processes and social patterns of the masses. It is 
they who pull the wires that control the public mind. (Bernays 1928: 47)
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With his roots in the patter of the circus barker, and his practices honed 
by techniques nurtured in the World Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, the 
public relations (PR) professional, while having more status than at 
any time in the industry's short history, remains a controversial ﬁgure, 
toeing a ﬁne line drawn 'between propaganda and public relations' 
(Ward 1995: 47). 
Public relations is most often deﬁned as the management function 
that aims to 'establish and maintain mutually beneﬁcial relationships 
between an organization, commercial or non-commercial, and the audi-
ences or "publics" on which the success of these entities depends' (Bates 
2002). There are those who suggest that public relations has a vital role 
to play in the modern democratic process, and that the 'conscious and 
intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the 
masses is an important element in democratic society' (Bernays 1928: 
47). In this way public relations, through its focus on media relations 
and building relationships with stakeholders, 'is an integral part of the 
civil society function. Civil society organisations need to reach various 
publics with information and create links between like-minded people' 
(Taylor 2000: 3). This argument purports that, where nation building is 
best understood as a communication process that emphasizes the crea-
tion and maintenance of relationships at various levels in society, public 
relations becomes central to this process and to the role of groups and 
organizations in mediating between the government and the public. 
It suggests that, 'ultimately, successful nation building is premised on 
the development of civil society structures that meet the needs of an 
assortment of publics rather than simply serving those in power' (Taylor 
and Kent 2002: 19).
 There are others, however, who maintain that PR is not a neutral 
technology that is available to all, even to those who wish to achieve 
socially responsible ends. It is, rather, something 'hidden and sordid' 
(Stauber and Rampton 1995: 14), at the heart of which is the conscious 
manipulation of the public, and upon on which 'corporations and gov-
ernment feel compelled to spend billions of dollars every year' (Stauber 
and Rampton 1995: 206). But, whether it is an intricate part of the demo-
cratic process working to 'grapple directly with the public's scepticism, 
self-consciousness, and weariness of images and ﬁnd new ways to frame 
mass appeals' (Jackall and Hirota 2000: 227), or a one-sided struggle 
over 'what is reality and how people will see and understand reality', 
public relations continues to insert itself ﬁrmly into day-to-day life. 2 
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Perception Is All: Percipi Est Esse
The perception industries around the world have grown alongside the 
expansion in importance of the mass communication media. Technologi-
cal developments and the current round of global economic integration 
have ensured that the mass communication media and its connected 
apparatus have become increasingly central to our daily lives. From 
satellite television and ﬁnancial data screens to 'emoticons' and mobile 
text messaging, it is the nervous system providing the electrical impulses 
and neuro-transmitters that allows this new economic reality to function, 
providing a nudge to 'the intensiﬁcation of world-wide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are 
shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' (Giddens 
1990: 64). Information is racing around the world at 'Netspeed' (Fried-
man 2000: 218), and governments which once felt they had secured the 
means of communicating to their people, now ﬁnd they compete for 
attention in a noisy marketplace buzzing with the clamour of everything 
from bloggers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to global 
consumer brands. 
Hand-in-hand with the growth of information-hungry media compa-
nies has come the development of the publicity apparatus. Partly fuelled 
by media demand for content and partly by the need of commercial and 
political operators to communicate to stakeholders, the public relations 
industry worldwide has seen a massive expansion in recent years. In 
2004, the PR industry saw its greatest growth rate since the tech boom, 
and further revenue increases are expected over the next ﬁve years. 
PR revenue in the US hit US$3.41 billion in 2004, a 12 per cent growth 
over the US$3.05 billion earned in 2003 (PR Week, 15 September 2005; 
Council of Public Relations Firms 2005). The PR giants are massive rev-
enue earners. Omnicom, which includes Fleishman-Hillard, Ketchum, 
Porter-Novelli, Weinstock and Gavin Anderson, made almost US$162 
million in the third quarter of 2005, up 11 per cent year-on-year.3 The 
Interpublic Group, which includes Golin-Harris and Weber-Shandwick 
Worldwide, made US$1.4 billion for the same period;4 and the WPP 
Group, which includes Burson-Marsteller, Hill & Knowlton, and Ogilvy 
Public Relations Worldwide reported revenue of more than 1.3 billion 
sterling in the third quarter of 2005, up 26 per cent year-on-year.5 
Alongside the communications media, the PR industry is having 
an increasingly profound impact on the political process and political 
institutions. Just as the development of the communication media has 
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'altered the publicness or visibility of actions in a fundamental way' , 
making elections media events, so the political process has become suf-
fused with the trends and techniques of 'political marketing' (Thompson 
2001: 179). The powerful have embraced the PR practitioner in order 
to get their messages across amidst the glare of public attention. From 
psychology and commercial advertising to opinion polls and political 
campaigning, the multimedia strategies employed to get elected seem 
to 'aim more and more overtly as forms of "subliminal persuasion"' 
(Zolo 2001: 415). And, just as public relations found its seat in the halls 
of commercial power, so it has secured a place inside the door of those 
who wield, or seek to wield, political power. An essential part of the 
political party's apparatus, PR skills became increasingly important in 
politics as populations grew and voters became 'more and more out of 
reach of the stump speaker, and mass communication was inevitably 
pushed to the fore' (Cutlip 1994: 29). This undisputed inﬂuence in the 
political process makes many uncomfortable, as 'governments have 
shown a growing tendency to professionally package and present in-
formation via the mass media' (Ward 1995: 165). This is a tendency that 
has increased over time.6
It is PR's growing inﬂuence on the media, with the increasing con-
vergence of journalism and public relations techniques over the past 
several decades, which has underlined its impact. The dwindling 
resources available to the news media, yet the increased requirements 
for the constant ﬂow of new ideas and information in a 24/7 industry, 
have seen the development of a new symbiotic relationship between PR 
professionals and journalists. PR practitioners have become skilful at 
engaging both the media and the commercial world through a pattern 
of services which include issues and crisis management, the provision 
of press releases, news tracking, video  news releases, and satellite 
distribution. The industry has become increasingly sophisticated, 'built 
on a foundation of routine news practices which it attempts to direct' 
(Fishman 1980: 15), to such an extent that it is claimed 'the practitioners 
of public relations have managed to usurp authorship of the news … a 
capacity put to the highest bidder' (Ward 1995: 158).
Of course, many groups attempt to inﬂuence public opinion and the 
political process using the same techniques, as the 'modern publicity 
process has generated a more media-centric model of pressure group 
activity' (Blumler 1990: 105). The high cost of the skilled professionals 
means, however, that real inﬂuence is something that only a few can 
afford. Critics see this as creating an environment for the manufacture 
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and control of public perception by an alliance between corporations 
seen as increasing proﬁts with disregard for public interest, politicians 
seeking political inﬂuence, PR professionals who are seen as practising 
deceptive methods, and journalists too accepting of PR sources and 
willing to bow to the companies that pay the bills. This, it is suggested, 
leads to an imbalance and the 'overall management of public opinion 
and policy by the few'.7
The Imagining of Nations:  
The Post-Colonial State and Public Relations
'PR for the nation state comprises communicative acts of a government…' 
(Kunczik 1997: 13)
While the advanced Western democracies are well-known users of 
public relations, and names such as Dick Morris and Gould Greenberg 
Carville/NOP are almost as famous as the politicians they support, what 
is less well known is the increasing reliance of new nation-states in the 
developing world on the image makers as technicians of sentiment and 
'discerners and purveyors of key emotional pushes to action' to shape 
their image (Jackall and Hirota 2000: 17). Indeed, PR has become an 
integral part of the day-to-day process of governing most nation-states 
around the world. This has played out, in part, as government efforts 
to persuade their citizens to accept policy, but also as part of their ef-
forts to manage their international image and to attempt to inﬂuence 
the large global powers, in particular the US administration. And it is 
the Western PR agencies that have become central in massaging their 
image for Western consumption. 
Since the World Trade Center bombing and the beginning of the 
Bush Administration's 'war on terror', effective public relations in the 
US has perhaps become a prerequisite for the long-term survival of a 
government in the Islamic world. Both Pakistan and the Philippines, two 
countries in the thick of George Bush's 'crusade', hired Weber Shandwick 
subsidiaries in 2002. Pakistan was paying Sterling International Consult-
ing Group US$50,000 per month to create a more favourable image for 
the country in the USA, and the Philippines was using Rhoads-Weber 
Shandwick Government Relations to facilitate its communications with 
the Pentagon (Corporate Watch 2003). Pakistan and the Philippines 
are also included on the client list of Patton Boggs, the law ﬁrm that 
undertakes lobbying in Washington for Oorvis, and where former US 
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ambassador to Singapore, Timothy Chorba, is on staff (Center for Media 
and Democracy: Qorvis Communications).
Other Asian nations have also hired US lobbyists in their desire to 
have their voice heard in Washington. Since July 1997, the Chinese and 
Hong Kong governments and government-controlled companies and 
organizations have spent at least a combined US$19 million lobbying 
the US government, with WPP topping the earnings list among ﬁrms 
that lobbied and conducted public relations on their behalf (Guevera 
and Williams 2005). 
Lobbying ﬁrm Cassidy & Associates has been associated with the Tai-
wan Political and Economic Research Institute (TPERI) (Taipei Times, 23 
August 2001). Top Republican lobbyist and PR ﬁrm DCI Group has been 
associated with Union of Myanmar (Burma) State Peace & Development 
Council,8 and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council is listed as 
a client of Wexler & Walker Public Policy Associates, a Washington DC 
lobbying and consulting ﬁrm specializing in international affairs and 
trade advocacy. It is an independent unit of PR ﬁrm Hill & Knowlton 
(Center for Media and Democracy: Wexler & Walker), itself associated 
with China and Indonesia (Stauber and Rampton 1995: 150). Singapore 
has also been active in Washington. According to public records, Sin-
gapore spent more than US$2 million dollars lobbying on Capitol Hill 
between 1998 and 2004, ranking 22nd amongst lobbyists. Interpublic was 
the main representative, earning more than US$1 million over that time 
period. What is most interesting is that Singapore was particularly busy 
on The Hill in 2003, spending more than three-quarters of a million dol-
lars in registered funds, up from less than US$200,000 in 2002 (Center 
for Public Integrity 2005).
This commitment to the use of public relations is part of an understand-
ing rooted in the development of many of the nations that came into being 
after the Second World War. The mass communications media has had a 
central role in the building of many of these post-colonial nation-states, in a 
Deutschian framework where society is a cybernetic order and the 'processes 
of communication are the basis of the coherence of societies, cultures, and 
even of the personalities of individuals' (Deutsch 1953: 87). The technology 
of communications allowed the mass distribution of the 'necessary illusions' 
(Chomsky 1988) that made the imagining of nations possible. The media were 
able to 'extend and consolidate traditional values ... nourishing [a] sense of 
identity and sense of belonging for individuals' (Thompson 1995: 194). Indeed, 
'the very conception of the newspaper implies the refraction of even world 
events into a speciﬁc world of vernacular readers' (Anderson 1983: 63). 
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While the embrace of the PR industry was a little slower in coming, it 
is now seen as a pressing concern as elites look to utilize its techniques 
as they ﬁnd their inﬂuence over the communication media slipping and 
their messages competing for space in a business marketplace of ideas. 
Information was once the jealously protected ward of the local elites. 
The nascent broadcast industry, in particular, was closely controlled by 
the newly independent governments and given a central role in nation 
building. Today, the international media giants, seeking proﬁtability 
through scale, have taken their place alongside local producers. They have 
extended their reach across Asia, eroding monolithic state ownership in an 
apparent profusion of choice and ownership, and creating a 'concentration 
of media capital through competition' (Keane 1991: 173). The global media, 
rather than inspiring democratic ideals, tend to be locked in their own 
battle of competing interests, rarely sowing the seeds of political conﬂict 
(McCargo 1999). The mass media and communications technology is still 
having a huge impact on politics in Southeast Asia. Here, as with much 
of the rest of the world, the communications media, and the perception 
industries so closely connected with them, are altering the very nature of 
politics and the ways in which political leaders relate to those they rule. 
Consequently, the region's elites are becoming 'increasingly sophisticated 
at manipulating their public images' (Thompson 2001: 173). 
Political elites and associated companies, due to the unholy trinity 
of globalization, technological change, liberalization and reform, now 
ﬁnd they are playing on a world stage, amidst sophisticated commu-
nicators, and they have to ﬁght for their usual place on the front pages 
of even their local newspapers. This has encouraged a general change 
of attitude towards communications, and a general expansion of the 
PR industry with Asian characteristics (PR Week, 19 July 2004). In this 
context, how Singapore behaves as a model of media control in the 
region (Woodier 2006) is an increasingly signiﬁcant area of study, to 
which we shall now turn. 
Singapore Embraces PR – from Singapore Girl to SARS
As a modern state, Singapore has been no stranger to public campaigns 
and global advertising. In 1973, a Western advertising agency developed 
one of the most signiﬁcant Asian brand icons, SIA's Singapore Girl (Chan 
2000). The interventionist government prides itself on its social engi-
neering, using social marketing to lead 'changes ranging from massive 
economic restructuring to social leaps in literacy and standard of living' 
66 ___________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
Jonathan Woodier __________________________________________________________
(Wong and Yeoh 1996: 1). But, from 1970, when the Institute of Public 
Relations of Singapore (IPRS) was founded as a non-proﬁt professional 
body, to the founding of the PR Academy in June 2002,9 the use to which 
the government has put public relations, and the sophistication with 
which it has used public information campaigns, changed dramati-
cally. As the media environment became more challenging and new 
technologies enabled the development of global news and information 
organizations, the Singapore government was forced to rethink how it 
delivered its messages to internal and external audiences. 
The communications media have been an important part of the Sin-
gapore government's arsenal for national development since it became 
an independent nation in 1965. A comprehensive campaign in the 1970s 
using the law courts, ownership and inﬂuence saw the taming of the 
media and the 'de-pluralization' of Singapore (Quah et al. 1985: 61). The 
government justiﬁes these actions by arguing that it is the responsibility 
of the press 'to forge consensus and not foment confrontation, facilitate 
nation-building and not fray the social fabric' (The Straits Times [here-
after ST], 12 November 1995). As a result, the communications pattern 
of Singapore has been 'largely one-way ﬂow from the leadership to 
the masses' (Kuo and Chan 1983: 102). The one-way model of com-
munication was symbolized not only by the developmental media but 
also by the public education campaigns for which the island state is so 
famous. Whether it be the early 'Keep Singapore Clean' campaign in 
1968,10 or the 'Make It Singapore' campaign at the end of 2003 – part of 
a S$15 million to boost the city's share of the business travel, meetings 
and incentives market (Media, 14 November 2003: 7), the government's 
statutory boards (83 autonomous government agencies set up by Act of 
Parliament), played the major role in the government's post-independ-
ence development strategy, and their activities usually served multiple 
economic and political goals. 
This model of communication began to change, however, when Goh 
Chok Tong became prime minister in 1990, and Lee Kuan Yew became 
senior minister. The idea of consensus and participation was introduced 
into politics. The local print media became a valuable pressure-valve 
allowing citizens to let off steam through their letters pages. There was 
also an increase in public consultation which the government deemed 
necessary to sell in its policies, from 'Meet the People' sessions for MPs, 
to feedback groups and public forums. The new model reﬂected the 
government's understanding that, as it embraced the global economy in 
the 1980s, economic and social change had created a different audience 
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and a different communications environment. This was underlined more 
than a decade later when Lee Hsien Loong was made prime minister. His 
father, Lee Kwan Yew, made it clear that his son had to persuade a new 
generation of Singaporeans who were better educated, well travelled, 
well informed and had 'absorbed Western ideas and they also demand 
that they be heard, so he has to hear them' (ST, 22 June 2004).
The government could no longer ignore the importance of informing, 
persuading and inﬂuencing its stakeholders, and PR was the interface 
through which it worked to communicate with its citizens, build consen-
sus, and enhance understanding and support of its actions and policies. 
As Lee Boon Yang, minister of information, communications and the 
arts put it in 2004: 'the government understands that it needs to con-
nect, consult and explain. Policies are not just disseminated downwards 
but increasingly a two-way communication process has to be adopted 
to ensure better public acceptance.'11 Indeed, from the early 1990s, this 
was institutionalized into the fabric of government, as work was done 
to improve the standards of communication in government and public 
bodies as part of the increased efforts to communicate and educate the 
public, to engender understanding, support and buy-in for the ruling 
PAP's programmes and policies.
Until the early 1990s, there were no formal PR ofﬁcers in govern-
ment bodies. In 1990, the Information Division of the MCI (Ministry of 
Communications and Information), and the Cultural Affairs Division of 
MCD (Ministry of Community Development), together with other as-
sociated departments and statutory boards, united to form the Ministry 
of Information and the Arts. BG (NS) George Yeo was MITA's acting 
minister, and subsequently its ﬁrst minister. At that time, MITA began 
training information ofﬁcers. These were seconded from MITA (now 
MICA – Ministry of Information, Communications and the Arts), and 
today are situated in all 14 ministries. In six, these ofﬁcers also act as 
press secretaries to the ministers. In this way, a network was created 
enabling the government to be more efﬁcient in its crisis management 
and to handle with panache threats to Singapore posed by the SARS 
epidemic, the ﬁnancial crisis and the current regional security issues.
The government of Singapore has shown itself to be well-versed 
in 'sophisticated media management' beyond its more blunt controls 
(George 1993: 133). The transfer of power mid-2004 between Goh Chok 
Tong, only Singapore's second prime minister, and Lee Hsien Loong, 
was another example of this sophistication, accompanied as it was by 
a cacophony of positive media messages, both about how smooth the 
68 ___________________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 23•2006
Jonathan Woodier __________________________________________________________
transfer was, how well timed it was, and what a great job Goh and the 
PAP had done in bringing Singapore through some challenging eco-
nomic times.12 Likewise, the suitability of Lee for the role was consist-
ently reinforced through positive stories in the media.13  PR professionals 
have become involved in the policy planning process, and media skills 
training has become de rigueur, particularly for top bureaucrats. In fact 
policy makers, as a whole, have been encouraged to become better com-
municators – not just their PR people. Cabinet papers had to include 
the possible public repercussions and how best to communicate their 
messages. By 2000, communication skills became an important part of 
the career development of senior members of the government: mile-
stone training programmes were included as part of career planning, 
as information communications and media skills became part of their 
critical path. The comments made by outgoing PM Goh in his ﬁnal Na-
tional Day Message indicated these priorities as he admitted his initial 
concerns, when ﬁrst appointed to lead the government, about his ability 
to communicate in front of the media, particularly television (The Straits 
Times Interactive [henceforth STI], 13 August 2004). 
Even the local media was roped in to encourage those reluctant com-
municators they needed to break the habits of a lifetime and be prepared 
to discuss controversial subjects. Both government departments and 
government-linked companies (GLCs), began to feel the lash of the 
pens of local media reporters keen to make a name for themselves, but 
wary, perhaps, of direct criticism of the ruling elite, pointing accusato-
rial ﬁngers at the 'fearful bureaucrats ... [who are] habitually evasive 
and defensive' (ST, 5 July 2002: 30). A key message from the new prime 
minister Lee Hsien Loong, was the commitment of the government to 
be more open and inclusive in its approach. 'Singapore today is more 
vibrant, open, resilient and cohesive', he said, adding, 'it is in sync with 
the times, and ready for tomorrow's challenges' (STI, 13 August 2004), 
and that Singaporeans 'should feel free to express diverse views, pursue 
unconventional ideas, or simply be different … have the conﬁdence to 
engage in robust debate, understand the problems being faced and offer 
fresh solutions' (Today, 13 August 2004: 1-2).
The embrace of public relations since the early 1990s was, if not 
enthusiastic, at least rigorous. The government is trying to cope with 
the challenging communications environment, and be responsive to 
changing expectations and the public demand for more and ever faster 
information. Many statutory bodies have PR consultants on retainer, 
and public campaigns have employed PR consultants, favouring the 
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large multinationals. Weber Shandwick, the largest PR company in the 
world and part of the Interpublic Group, has been used by Singapore in 
various campaigns including Singapore Tourism Board's 'Clean Toilets' 
initiative and to provide media training to Contact Singapore. Another 
early example was the use of Ogilvy & Mather Public Relations for Sin-
gapore's environmental 'Clean and Green' campaign (Asian Advertising 
& Marketing, September 1991). 
However, it is the Singapore government's relationship with Burson 
Marsteller (BM), one of the world's leading PR consultancies, which has 
shown such remarkable success of late. Burson Marsteller was given the 
high-proﬁle job of cleaning up the image of the Singapore Prison Service, 
which included not only an outstanding advertising campaign to pro-
mote the lot of ex-cons, but also putting together a non-proﬁt company 
with S$1 million to encourage small businesses and co-operatives to hire 
people with criminal records. This relationship recently culminated in 
the award-winning SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) crisis 
management and recovery programme. BM, which also worked on 
the Hong Kong government's SARS campaign (O'Dwyers 2003), was 
awarded the IPRS's 2004 Prism Excellence Award for Crisis Management 
for its work in 2003. 
The SARS crisis came as a shock for Singapore, which had escaped 
the worst of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of the late 1990s, but was slipping 
into what was the nastiest economic recession it had faced since early 
independence. Singapore's economy was hit hard in 2001, as economic 
slowdown in the United States, Japan, and other key trading partners 
reduced demand for the city-state's electronics exports. The economy 
contracted by an estimated 2.2 per cent in 2001 after growing by 9.9 per 
cent in 2000, and as many as 25,000 Singaporeans lost their jobs during 
the year (Freedom House 2002). 
BM's campaign, which was successful in minimizing the impact 
of the crisis, employed many of the classic elements of an integrated 
public relations campaign, which can also be seen in the government's 
ongoing crisis management of the regional security issues. First of all, 
it was important to get the fundamentals right and control the spread 
of the disease, at least in the perception of all target audiences. This 
was achieved amongst both the internal and external audiences by in-
stituting various controls which clearly showed both the political will 
and technical ability to limit the risks of contamination. These included 
temperature checks at the workplace and at immigration, the setting up 
of a special treatment centre to isolate patients, and the use of legisla-
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tive powers to limit the spread and to ease public concerns. This was 
all carried out with unusual transparency, a fact government ofﬁcials 
continued to reinforce, led by PM Goh, who underlined the fact while 
in Japan as the SARS epidemic began to take hold in East Asia in March 
2003 (STI, 27 March 2003). 
Subsequently, the image of a city beset by 'plague' needed to be 
changed, and people had to be persuaded back onto the streets and 
into public places. The government's 'Step Out Singapore' campaign, 
which included street concerts and outdoor events, helped to provide 
a more favourable backdrop for television pictures of Singapore than 
that of empty streets peopled only by a few scurrying ﬁgures in surgical 
masks. It was also important to involve key opinion leaders, particularly 
for international positioning: the international media (here, growing 
ties between global media organizations with their Asian headquarters 
in Singapore really paid off), international health organizations and 
international business leaders. The chairman of British bank Standard 
Chartered, Sir Patrick Gillam, was quoted as having no qualms about 
ﬂying into town as planned. Likewise, the fact that German Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroeder did not alter plans to visit Singapore and other coun-
tries in Southeast Asia, was covered in the media (STI, 25 April 2003). 
Also signiﬁcant was the WHO's approval: Singapore avoided being 
put on a 'travel warning' list alongside Toronto, Hong Kong, Guangzhou 
and Beijing. Mr Ali S. Khan of the WHO praised the Republic's efforts 
in ﬁghting the spread of the disease:
 'I think the Singapore Government has done an excellent job and I really 
would not characterise it as draconian … I would say they have put in 
state-of-the-art public health measures, with complete transparency' (STI, 
27 April 2003). 
Singapore's appreciation for this conﬁdence was demonstrated in 
its sponsorship of a WHO conference on crisis management and dis-
ease in Singapore in September 2004, which gave the government an 
opportunity to burnish its image a little further. Statutory boards and 
government organizations all pitched in. The Economic Development 
Board (EDB) and International Enterprise Singapore gave daily updates 
to all their clients. EDB chairman, Teo Ming Kian, even wrote to CEOs 
of major companies around the world to reassure them of Singapore's 
determination to stamp out the virus (STI, 25 April, 2003). The American 
Chamber of Commerce was one international organization in Singapore 
that praised the government's handling of the crisis. The Chamber's 
chairman, Kristin Paulson, said: 'Singapore has taken a leadership role, 
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globally, in the ﬁght against SARS and its approach is a model to be 
adopted by other countries' (STI, 25 April 2003). 
Singapore's decision to focus on the public health aspect of the prob-
lem and resist having a huge economic stimulus package also received 
a nod from The Asian Wall Street Journal (26 March 2003: A7) in an edi-
torial headlined 'SARS bail-outs are a bad idea'. The Journal admitted 
that it had sometimes been critical of Singapore's degree of protection 
of civil liberties but lauded Singapore for being transparent and proac-
tive in ﬁghting the spread of SARS. Yes, the Journal is a well-known 
advocate of ﬁscal restraint, but clearly efforts to ensure regular and 
positive coverage on the international stage proved fruitful. Another 
global media name, the BBC, also signed up alongside Singapore's ad-
mirers. Again, it was not the electronic tagging of quarantine breakers 
which was highlighted by this bastion of the liberal media, but rather 
a celebration of temperature checks at immigration and Singapore's 
other efforts to contain the virus. The British broadcaster's ﬂagship 10 
pm news bulletin devoted the entire ﬁrst part of one programme to 
what the Republic was doing to combat the SARS virus (STI, 27 April 
2003). These articles were included on the SARS website put up by the 
government to keep investors, visitors and Singaporeans up to date 
with its efforts to combat the virus.14
The success of the campaign was such that a global award accompanied 
the local recognition. In July 2004, Tan Tock Seng Hospital received a Golden 
World Award for excellence in public relations from the UK-based Interna-
tional Public Relations Association (IPRA) for its campaign to restore conﬁ-
dence in the health system of Singapore during and after the SARS crisis.15 
Most important of all, the Singapore government has proved a good learner. 
The PR techniques honed from integrated communication campaigns like 
that against SARS, have been brought to bear on what is probably Singapore's 
greatest challenge since independence, the 'war against terror'.
Winning Singapore's War against Terror
The US 'war against terror', like the SARS crisis, did not come at a good 
time for Singapore. The Bali blasts in October 2002, which killed 202 
people, and the August 2003 suicide bombing at the J.W. Marriott Hotel 
in Jakarta that left 12 people dead, were even more threatening to the 
Singapore's economic well-being and political stability. The economy 
was struggling with deep structural problems and was ill-prepared for 
either the slowdown that came with the end of the tech stock bubble, 
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or for the regional impact of SARS. Where a decade ago Singapore was 
close behind China in attracting foreign investments to Asia, by the 
end of 2003 China had received nearly seven times as much, and India 
was also an emerging competitive threat as Singapore's share of global 
trade became either 'stagnant or shrinking' (Financial Times, 12 August 
2004: 2). At the same time, the importance of the US to the Singapore 
economy and to the healthy functioning of its neighbours was undimin-
ished. The US was the biggest foreign investor in Southeast Asia with 
direct investments of nearly US$90 billion, and its third largest export 
market valued at US$50 billion. Moreover, international concern about 
the security situation in Southeast Asia was very real. 
In the middle of 2004, the president of the US-ASEAN Business 
Council, Ernest Bower, organized a trade mission to the US led by the 
region's US ambassadors. The mission heard concerns raised at meetings 
in Washington and elsewhere in the US about terrorism in the region 
(Today, 23 August 2004: 10). At the same time, a new report by Australia's 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Combating Terrorism in the 
Transport Sector – Economic Costs and Beneﬁts, indicated that investors 
were already very wary, and the impact of a pull-back would be severe 
(The Business Times, 22 June 2004: 1). 
Singapore's crisis management teams swung into action. With security 
traditionally the government's number one concern, it sought advice 
from global consultants such as PR ﬁrm Ruder Finn, which was working 
closely with the Homeland Security Department in the US. Singapore, 
from the outset, showed that it was prepared to act swiftly and decisively 
when dealing with terror threats. In the wake of 9/11, the government 
cracked down on individuals alleged to be linked to 'terrorist' organiza-
tions, detaining 34 men without charge or trial under the Internal Security 
Act (ISA), with little or no complaint from formerly critical liberal West-
ern governments and media. Most of these alleged members of Jemaah 
Islamiyah (blamed for the blasts in Bali and at the Jakarta Marriott, and 
said to have been plotting to attack US facilities in Singapore post 9/11), 
disappeared into the air-conditioned ISD interrogation centre off Whitely 
Road. No legal niceties or complicated proceedings were needed to put 
suspects behind bars – unlike in Indonesia, where Muslim cleric Abu 
Bakar Bashir deﬁed prosecutors keen to link him to a series of attacks, 
including the Bali bombing (FEER, 27 May 2004: 20).
Dr Tony Tan, the coordinating minister for security and defence, out-
lined a new national anti-terrorism strategy in July 2004,16 and a plan 
to get the new National Security Coordination Secretariat and its two 
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agencies up and running quickly (STI, 18 August 2004). Singapore indi-
cated that it was prepared to go above and beyond the call of duty, for 
example in the requirements of the international maritime security code 
to safeguard ships against terrorism and start tracking the movements of 
virtually every vessel in its waters (STI, 5 August 2004). It was a similar 
story for airport security: speaking at the SATS Security Services confer-
ence in April 2004, second minister for transport, Dr Balaji Sadasivan, 
said Singapore was working for an audit from the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and would 'work to have a standard even 
higher than what the audit requires' (Today, 15 April 2004: 1).
The government left the US in no doubt where it stood in the 'war 
against terror', with statements of unequivocal support for, and close 
co-operation with the US administration. Dr Tan, by now a familiar face 
at the Pentagon in Washington where he regularly met US Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, emphasized the need for close international 
co-ordination to break up global terrorist networks. Rumsfeld, in return, 
emphasized the value the US administration placed on this co-operation: 
'It is a very close relationship, not just military to military, but a politi-
cal and economic relationship, which we value greatly,' he said (STI, 
22 April 2004). These close ties included allowing American warships 
to call in to Singapore for repairs and stop-overs, and the same went 
for US military aircraft. The March 2001 completion of the deep-draft 
pier at Changi Naval Base, constructed entirely at Singapore's expense, 
provided support for a continued US presence in the region for many 
years to come (See GlobalSecurity.org). There was also a US communica-
tions and logistics unit based in Singapore to co-ordinate the stop-overs. 
Singapore also sent police trainers, transport aircraft and other support 
equipment to Iraq to add its name to the list of allies occupying the 
country after the ouster of Saddam Hussein (STI, 22 April 2004). 
And when others – even close neighbours and fellow members of 
ASEAN – faltered, Singapore stood ﬁrm alongside its key ally. A state-
ment from the Foreign Ministry emphasized its support for Washington's 
position that Coalition forces in Iraq should not make any concessions 
to hostage-takers: 'Succumbing to such threats will only increase the 
dangers, weaken the Iraqi government, and delay Iraq's reintegration 
into the world economy' (STI, 5 August 2004). The comments came soon 
after a decision by the Philippines to accelerate the planned departure 
of its troops from Iraq to secure the release of a hostage. 
Singapore's government even went so far as to suggest, in April 2004, 
that US-led forces might be needed to help police the Malacca Straits, 
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seen as a key target for terrorists given its strategic importance. While 
Dr Tan was at the Pentagon, his colleague defence minister Teo Chee 
Hean told a meeting of marine and military experts that that there was 
not enough security in the 900km sea-lane to stop a terrorist attack there. 
Saying that the measures taken by Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia 
were not enough, he then painted the nightmare scenario of what would 
happen if such an attack were to take place, given that one-third of the 
world's shipping and half of its oil pass through the straits off Southeast 
Asia. The rear admiral (NS) said: 
The littoral states are obviously not the only stakeholders in the Malacca 
Straits. Other users have a strong economic, if not also strategic interest 
in ensuring that the Malacca Straits is kept open and safe … they could 
contribute resources needed for the ﬁght. (Today, 21 May 2004: 6) 
The idea was quickly quashed by Malaysia, but, as US President 
George W. Bush announced a reshufﬂing of troops in Asia, Singapore 
announced new unilateral moves to deepen its defence ties with Wash-
ington. Dr Tony Tan, speaking at a press conference at the Istana Palace 
in August 2004, said that Singapore was negotiating a 'strategic security 
framework' with the United States and that Singapore supports the 
presence of the US military in the region because it adds an element of 
stability in Southeast Asia (STI, 18 August 2004).
Singapore also worked hard to have its voice heard on the international 
stage. It was represented as the only Asian member of the UN anti-terror 
team, appointed in April 2004 (Today, 12 April 2004: 6). Singapore also 
secured its place as the chosen venue for the annual security conference 
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Shangri-La 
Dialogue, named after the hotel in which it was held, was the only inter-
governmental forum in Asia focusing on defence and security-related 
topics (STI, 23 August 2004). Key opinion leaders have also been primed 
to take Singapore's part. Terrorist expert, academic Rohan Gunaratne, 
from his position in Singapore as associate professor at IDSS (Institute 
of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University) 
and head of the International Centre for Political Violence and Research 
in Singapore, delivered a speech in April 2004 at an international security 
conference, when he said that there were 'no terrorist groups in Singapore' 
that they had been 'neutralized' by the Singapore government when it 
'swooped on existing cells in December 2001'. He reassured the watching 
world that these groups would not resurface as the Singapore govern-
ment had been 'very efﬁcient in reducing the terrorist threat … in stark 
contrast' to the hundred-fold increase in worldwide terrorist threats since 
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Saddam had been overthrown. The Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, he 
suggested, posed a 'signiﬁcant threat' (Today, 15 April 2004: 1). 
Despite its earlier record in the mid-1990s as a proponent of Asian 
values, all such arguments were dropped in the post 9/11 environment. 
Singapore was determined to be seen as secular if not Western. The 
government made a show of embracing a liberal reform process by ac-
cepting the advice of parliamentary committees such as that considering 
'Remaking Singapore'. A country that employs gays in the government 
and sanctions dancing on bar tops surely is a friend of the liberal West, 
if not almost liberal itself (Guardian, 18 April 2004). Singapore even be-
gan a campaign to become the regional centre for NGOs. While, strictly 
speaking, NGOs are not new to Singapore, independent organizations 
had not been welcomed, and were depicted by the senior Lee, as the 'fads 
of contemporary activists who copy Western ideas, with little impact 
or relevance on the business of Singapore and its development' (ST, 16 
October 2001: H3). But, as security concerns forced organizations like 
Helen Keller International to leave their regional home in Indonesia, 
Singapore offered itself as a new regional base (STI, 7 June 2004). And 
should the international media not stay on message, there were Singa-
pore's familiar defamation laws to remind them just who was boss, as 
The Economist found in September 2004 (STI, 3 September 2004).
The right messages were also placed in the local media, where their 
international brethren might pick them up, not only keeping account of 
Singapore's security campaign, but of the continued economic advan-
tages of investing in the island state.17 Should Singaporeans feel that the 
government had been too successful in dealing with terrorism, the work 
continued through the local media to maintain Fortress Singapore. This 
was achieved by (i) playing on the fear and perceived vulnerability of the 
predominantly Chinese population of this small island state surrounded 
by Malay peoples and, often, by opposing religious and political ideolo-
gies; (ii) justifying the position of the ruling PAP and (iii) ensuring the 
political legitimacy and longevity of its authoritarian rule. From Tony 
Tan's warning of the threat to small densely populated countries such 
as Singapore from rogue scientists who use their knowledge to create 
deadly biological agents (STI, 7 April 2004), to seeking Interpol's help 
to deal with cyber terrorists (STI, 14 November 2004), or to the familiar 
warning of JI plots (STI, 5 August 2004), the justiﬁcation for maintaining 
tight controls at home remained ﬁrm. Where the legal requirements did 
not exist to ensure that the perimeter and ﬁrewalls were well buttressed, 
they were quickly introduced. The changes to the Amendments to the 
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Computer Misuse Act, seen by critics as the cyberspace equivalent of 
the Internal Security Act, showed that the government was swift to arm 
itself with the necessary weapons to maintain national security and 
essential services, 'further tightening of the city state's control over the 
Internet' (FT, 12 November 2003: 2). 
This has all been to good effect. There is no doubt that the warmth and 
good will with which Singapore has been received by the US is indica-
tive of the success of this huge PR campaign security (STI, 6 May 2004). 
The ﬁnal US seal of approval on Singapore's tough stance on terrorism 
was the decision by the secretary of homeland security, Tom Ridge, to 
attend Singapore's annual National Day reception in Washington, a ﬁrst 
for a cabinet-level US ofﬁcial (FEER, 19 August 2004). 
Conclusion
The public relations industry has stolen our dreams and returned them to 
us as privileged illusions. (Stauber and Rampton 1995: 206)
As the mass communication media move to the centre of daily life, 
globalization is creating a more complex communications environment. 
The technology that makes this possible also allows for the creation 
of electronic networks that offer alternative methods of mobilization 
and accurate targeting. Politicians around the world are therefore left 
to compete with everything from soap powders to banks to get their 
messages across to the consumer. It is a challenge they are increasingly 
meeting with the help of PR professionals – image makers who help 
market ideas in a mediated world where the celebriﬁcation of politics 
threatens to exchange discussion of policy and political choice for de-
signer labels and branded slogans. 
To suggest that communications campaigns in Southeast Asia can 
'educate and empower, level the playing ﬁeld, and bring the nation to a 
state of equilibrium whereby all people have the opportunity to develop 
the fullest potential' (Taylor and Kent 2002: 22) is something that needs 
more careful situational analysis. Instead of truly creating something 
new, differentiated and exciting, we risk slipping into a postmodern, 
illusory world where everything becomes advocacy in a managed re-
ality: such an 'epistemological Hobbesianism makes doublethink and 
doublespeak respectable' (Jackall and Hirota 2000: 27). 
The various elements of the perception industries have become a 
powerful source of inﬂuence and information. People employ them to 
make sense of their lives, thereby rendering them a useful tool for the 
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powerful as they attempt to inﬂuence their constituents. And, while 
the increasingly cynical modern audience does play an important role 
as 'situated interpreters' (Keane 1991: 38), it is equally important to un-
derstand that the persuaders are becoming increasingly sophisticated 
(The Economist, 22 May 2002).
The Singapore government, with its long experience of public cam-
paigns, is leading the way in the region, not only with its media policies, 
but in its sophisticated use of PR. As the number and frequency of its 
campaigns dropped and the government of Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong shifted its policy from its previous top-down approach to a more 
participatory style, persuasion has taken a slightly different and more 
subtle form, as is evident from the way the government has dealt with 
recent challenges to Singapore's stability and prosperity. 
Integrated public relations campaigns have proved more valuable in de-
fending Singapore's image in the face of threats like disease and security, 
than the usual practice of berating Western governments for decadence 
and decay. To be voted the safest city in the world (Conde Naste Traveller, 
21 September 2004), as another bomb exploded at the Australian embassy 
in Jakarta, can only reinforce the efﬁcacy of its strategy. The rewards of this 
strategy are obvious, from the Congressional salutes and US Administra-
tion photo opportunities, to the bilateral Free Trade Agreement awarded 
as a concrete sign of Singapore's successful rehabilitation.
Indeed, in the post 9/11 world, the government has found some un-
likely Western supporters in its clampdown on dissent. 'Asian values' 
were once the talisman used by the Singapore government to ward 
off what it saw as the worst effects of globalization, namely the move 
towards liberal democracy and the undermining of its authority. The 
attacks on the US and the global ﬁnancial fallout from both the telecom-
munications stock price meltdown and the Enron-inspired corporate 
scandals have tested the commitment of even the strongest proponents of 
globalization. With many in the West now wary of its ramiﬁcations, the 
Singapore authorities have found themselves back in the fold amongst 
their Cold War allies, in their efforts to control change and counter op-
position, and with the noise from liberal governments greatly reduced. 
Thus the 'war against terror' serves merely to reinforce the garrison-state 
mentality, providing a ﬁllip to authoritarianism, and standing in op-
position to the global, open media policies of the 1990s.
Singapore's charm offensive is symbolic of the ascendant role PR is 
playing in politics in Asia. Moreover, while 9/11 has helped to silence 
critics internally and externally, Singapore's government has displayed 
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sophisticated communication skills and an ability to manage perceptions 
in the face of challenges from SARS to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. 
In this it has effectively neutralized critics as well as dissuading external 
agencies or political forces from supporting local political/civil society 
movements. With a keen understanding of the mass communication 
media as both a commercial animal and a political tool, the Singapore 
government has maintained its role as a stern and effective gatekeeper, 
barring much that might obviously threaten its surveillance state. It has 
become less brutal stylistically. Indeed, many would suggest it has shown 
remarkable ﬂexibility. The PAP has changed its image to accommodate 
media fashion without relinquishing any control. It assumes a media-
friendly style, but the politically illiberal message remains the same.
Thus, the government has been successful in not only shoring up 
Fortress Singapore in the eyes of its internal audience, but also in ef-
fectively assuaging the concerns of its external allies in the 'war against 
terror', despite efforts by the international media to paint an increas-
ingly gloomy picture of the security situation in Southeast Asia. It has 
achieved this via an integrated public relations campaign that has helped 
Singapore to reclaim its position as Guardian of the East.
Jonathan Woodier is the Deputy Director of Corporate Affairs for Citigroup 
Europe, Middle East and Africa
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